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Beyond Responsive Regulation: The expanding role of non-state actors in the regulatory process

Abstract
This comment extends the vision of Responsive Regulation by noting subsequent developments in regulatory pluralism, in particular those occurring under private auspices.  The apparent weakening or withdrawal of state regulatory institutions has inspired considerable regulatory activity on the part of non-state actors.  In addition, the concurrent growth and pervasiveness of digital technology have greatly facilitated the involvement of individual citizens in non-state regulatory activity. However, the full implications of what might be called ‘wiki-regulation’ remain to be seen. The risks that accompany private regulation may include the lack of accountability of non-state regulatory actors, and the possibility of their failure. There is also a risk that with the increasing salience of what Vogel calls “civil regulation,” state regulatory institutions may atrophy, or fail to develop at all. 
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Introduction
Although Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) acknowledge (and indeed, advocate) the involvement of non-state actors in the regulatory process, their pyramid is state-centric. They refer to a diversity of regulatory institutions, but aside from public interest groups and enforced self-regulation, they do so in relatively general terms. The book’s final chapter refers to delegation to and participation in regulatory activity by third parties, essentially under the ambit of the state.  However, the authors stop just short of exploring a much wider regulatory landscape, where a variety of private actors are in a position to play very significant regulatory roles, beyond state auspices.

Three general trends, themselves interrelated, have emerged or intensified since the book’s original publication. First is the weakening, or at the very least, the symbolic withdrawal of state regulatory activities, in both developed and developing countries.  Second, and arguably a reaction to this apparent regulatory vacuum, is the increase in the number and activity of nongovernmental participants in the regulatory process.  Third, is the growth of digital technology, which greatly facilitates communications between widely dispersed individuals, without editorial or governmental mediation. Communication has become democratized and information made accessible to an unprecedented extent, and the potential for citizen involvement in the regulatory process is greater than ever.

The following pages will briefly review the ascendancy of non-state regulatory activity since the appearance of Responsive Regulation, and will confirm that state-centric regulatory theory has given way to the more complex and fragmented regulatory systems observed by Bartley (2007), Black (2008), and Meidinger (2009). The democratization of technology has empowered individuals as never before, and may well facilitate the mobilization of mass publics in furtherance of “wiki-regulation.”  The comment concludes with a discussion of some of the risks that private regulation may pose. Not least of these are the lack of accountability of non-state regulatory actors, and the possibility of failure. There is also a risk that with the increasing salience of what Vogel (2010) calls “civil regulation,” state regulatory institutions may atrophy, or fail to develop at all. 


The Retreat of the State
The Thatcher and Reagan ascendancies of the 1980s were accompanied by considerable deregulatory rhetoric (Yergin and Stanislaw 1998). Whether driven by politics, by ideology, or by global market pressures, governments in most industrialized nations sought to avoid antagonizing commercial interests.  Efforts to this end have included tax relief, as well as a trend towards the lessening of restrictions on how to go about one’s business. The past three decades have hardly seen the disappearance of regulation as a state function, as scandals and disasters have often been followed by significant regulatory responses. To cite but a few examples from the United States, the S&L debacle of the 1980s was followed by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989, the collapse of Enron in 2001 led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,  and the global financial crisis of 2008 gave rise to the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (PL 111-203 (​http:​/​​/​www.gpo.gov​/​fdsys​/​pkg​/​PLAW-111publ203​/​content-detail.html​)). And of course, the tobacco industry has been under persistent regulatory pressure for over half a century (Kluger 1986). Nevertheless, the high-water mark of direct state intervention in commerce seems to have passed, and some governments have even established agencies dedicated to deregulation.​[1]​ In the world’s poorer countries, the state’s willingness or capacity to protect public health, to safeguard the environment, to provide decent working conditions, and to insure the integrity of financial institutions, remains limited for the foreseeable future.
  
The Rise of Regulatory Pluralism
The regulatory lethargy of the state has stimulated energetic activity on the part of non-state actors, and the cosmopolitan nature of contemporary regulatory space has more than validated the paradigm of regulatory pluralism. The concept is derived from that of legal pluralism, which is based on the recognition that the law exists alongside a variety of lesser normative orderings. Galanter (1981 20) observed that the legal system is often a secondary rather than a primary locus of regulation. Griffiths (1986 4) referred to legal reality as not monolithic, but rather an “unsystematic collage of inconsistent and overlapping parts. Grabosky (1995) noted a variety of ways in which non-state resources could be harnessed in furtherance of regulatory compliance.  Julia Black (2001) referred to a ‘postregulatory world’ in which governments no longer monopolize regulation, and later noted the complexity and fragmentation of regulatory systems (see also Levi-Faur 2005; Bartley 2007;  Black 2008; Meidinger 2009). Of considerable significance is the question of whether these various regulatory activities, whatever their auspices, are amenable to some degree of coordination, or occur in a less scripted manner. Advocates of state-centric meta-regulation would seem to favor a degree of choreography under state auspices, whereas others may see a regulatory system characterized by spontaneity as inevitable. In any event, regulatory space is contested, and resulting relational interactions between institutions are often complex (Fransen 2011). As Bartley (2007) observed, non-state initiatives are often inspired, if not provoked, by state inaction. At the same time, governments may actually encourage compensatory initiatives of a quasi-regulatory nature on the part of private actors. Bartley attributes the rise of private certification schemes (such as those operating under the auspices of the Forest Stewardship Council or the Marine Stewardship Council) to the failure of governments and of intergovernmental organizations. However, he observes that in some instances, governments provided financial assistance to NGOs to facilitate the development of private certification programs (Bartley 2003; 2007).

Private regulation
Markets themselves can serve as regulatory institutions. Commercial activity within the private sector, and the influence it exerts upon and through markets, has already had a significant effect on the regulatory landscape.  Its potential contribution is even greater (Grabosky 1994; Vandenbergh 2007).

Suppliers' practices can bear upon a retailer's public image, and buyers are increasingly sensitive to the risk of being tainted by a supplier's questionable environmental performance. To this end, buyers are tending increasingly to scrutinise products from a 'cradle to grave' perspective, noting such considerations as energy efficiency in manufacture, minimization and responsible disposal of waste, economical use of materials in packaging, and recyclability of product (Stuart 1992).

Large retailers are in a position to communicate their product and process preferences with suppliers, and the awesome purchasing power which large retailers command often carries considerable influence. The influence of the retail sector in driving innovation is widely recognized (Porter 1990, 502; 523), and the influence wielded by a large buyer can be enormous. As one informant once told the author, “When McDonald’s says ‘Jump,’ 500 suppliers ask ‘How high?’” (see also Dauvergne and Lister 2011).

An interesting aspect of much private regulation is the manner in which it has been driven by the increase in global trade. Since the initial publication of Responsive Regulation, a great deal of manufacturing activity has moved from the developed to the developing world, where state regulatory standards have tended to be relatively weak, or nonexistent. In affluent countries, media coverage of imported products that are unsafe, and of manufacturing practices that are exploitative of workers or harmful to the environment, has attracted considerable negative attention. This has helped shape consumer preferences for “clean,” “green” or “fair” products, whose raw materials are obtained and whose manufacturing processes are conducted in an environmentally preferable manner, free of exploitative labor practices, and consistent with human rights. Many importers, conscious of their brand image, have required their suppliers to comply with exacting standards of health, safety, human rights, and environmental protection.

The need to ensure compliance with these standards has significantly enhanced the importance of a relatively old industry. In the mid-19th century, European marine insurance companies hired inspectors to assess the seaworthiness of vessels. Underwriters Laboratories, established in 1894, tested and certified electrical products (Cheit 1990). Private assurance is often linked to standards, either those established by generalist bodies such as the ISO, or more specialist organizations such as the Forest Stewardship Council, the Marine Stewardship Council, or the Apparel Industry Partnership/Fair Label Association. (Bartley 2003 2007; Auld et al 2010; Meidinger 2009).

Vandenbergh (2007, 1) reports that “more than half of the largest firms in eight retail and industrial sectors impose environmental requirements on their domestic and foreign suppliers.” Such private contractual requirements trump state regulatory activity. Vandenbergh refers to this form of private regulatory power as “the new Wal-Mart effect.” When the visible hand of the state is absent or weak, the once invisible, but now quite apparent hand of the market may compensate.

Other examples of private regulatory activity exceeding that of the state include the following:
	The proposed disposal by Shell UK of the Brent Spar oil storage buoy by sinking it was supported by the British Government in 1995. A high-profile Greenpeace media campaign for more environmentally responsible disposal aroused widespread support in Europe. The rig itself was occupied by protestors for three weeks, and massive consumer boycotts were organized on the European continent. Shell opted for on-shore disposal alternatives. ( Weale 1995; Dickson and McCulloch 1996; Bennie 1998; Skjaerseth and Skodvin 2001)
	The redevelopment of a 19th century industrial area of Melbourne was authorized by the Government of Victoria with a requirement for only minimal soil remediation. Lending institutions required a more rigorous cleanup as a condition of finance (Environment Protection Authority 2001 100).
	A UK-based supermarket chain is able to set standards for the application of agricultural chemicals by Australian wineries’ contract grape growers. Unless the buyers are satisfied with the nature of the chemical applied, its concentration, and the duration between application and harvest, they will buy wine elsewhere. A foreign company exercises more power over the growers that any Australian government would ever do (Sas 1998). The ‘new Wal-Mart effect’ reaches well beyond China.
	Copy paper sold in Australia by a major office supply retailer was tested by a laboratory in Wisconsin, funded by a private NGO, Markets for Change. The analysis revealed the paper to contain 84% pure rainforest fibre. When advised of this, the retailer announced the cancellation of all contracts with the supplier Manning (2011; http://www.marketsforchange.org/?s=officeworks (​http:​/​​/​www.marketsforchange.org​/​?s=officeworks​)).
	Adverse publicity and civil litigation in the aftermath of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill may well impose costs far in excess of what a government could achieve by means of the criminal process (Force et al 2011).

The Democratization of Technology
Technology has certainly enhanced the regulatory capacity of those states that wish to exercise it. Satellite remote sensing can detect unauthorized land clearance (Bartel 2005). DNA testing can determine the provenance of marine, forest, or agricultural products. GPS devices can track the movement of waste materials. Chemical analysis can identify product content with increasing specificity (Auld et al 2010). Technology has also increased the regulatory capacity of non-state actors.​[2]​ Means of surveillance, information storage and retrieval, testing, and communications that were once exclusive instruments of the state (if they existed al all) are now within the reach of ordinary citizens. Mobile telephones now serve as video cameras. Private testing of forest products was noted above. Conservation activists use unmanned aerial vehicles to track the Japanese whaling fleet (Warwick 2012). Among the more dramatic manifestations of the democratization of technology is the emergence of social media.

Social media and private regulation
We are now well into the information revolution, and one is beginning to see the enormous potential for digital technology to enhance the regulatory capacity of ordinary citizens. The potential of social networking to build social capital has been noted by Ellison et al (2007). As envisaged by Ayres and Braithwaite, citizens can exercise vigilance over the performance of regulatory agencies, or over the behavior of corporate actors directly. Some of the most vivid manifestations of citizen mobilization have occurred in China, where the investigative capacity of ordinary citizens using such media has been shown to be formidable. 

The Chinese term to describe this application of digital technology is “human-flesh search engine” (renrou sousuo yinqing). Described somewhat more elegantly by Downey (2010) as “crowd-sourced detective work, pursued online,” it has been mobilized against low-level corruption and other gross anti-social behavior.  The environmental impact of Chinese economic development has led to a number of protest demonstrations, facilitated by such technologies as internet and text messaging. Some of these have been successful in forcing the cancellation or postponement of development projects (Wang 2010).  The flurry of online criticism of rail transport safety following the crash of a “bullet train” in July 2011 triggered state censorship of media, which was also criticized in online forums. Across the Pacific, one sees online encouragement of consumer boycotts​[3]​   and websites that monitor particular industries or companies.​[4]​  Thus does technology facilitate the mobilization and sustainability of mass action to an extent unimaginable before the coming of the digital age.

Crowdsourcing has many applications to regulation, not least of which is the reporting of apparent noncompliance. Well before the widespread takeup of digital technology, Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986) observed various forms of citizen participation in the regulatory process, including measurement of beach erosion, surveillance over the sites of historic shipwrecks, and monitoring of prices in retail stores. Today, surveillance and reporting is easier than ever. An internet link of surveillance cameras along the US-Mexico border invites the public to monitor suspicious activity in real time, and report it to law enforcement.​[5]​  Sharesleuth.com, a website concerned with exposing securities fraud and corporate misconduct, encourages readers to send in tips and comments.​[6]​

Citizens may also assist in labor-intensive investigation of non-compliance. The Chinese examples referred to above include one case involving the perpetrator of a wanton act of animal cruelty who was traced to a remote corner of the country and identified. In the United Kingdom, The Guardian newspaper posted hundreds of thousands of documents relating to expenses claimed by Members of Parliament, inviting members of the public to review them for questionable claims. Over 25,000 citizens did so.​[7]​  

Crowdsourcing also lends itself to policy development and to investigation under state auspices. The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has established an online forum for the public to voice ideas for the enhancement of the national broadband infrastructure.​[8]​  In an entirely different regulatory domain, Roadkill observation systems invite members of the public to report species and location data to assist in wildlife management.​[9]​  The full potential of ‘wiki-regulation has yet to be determined. Nor can the accountability problems posed by such extreme democratization be easily discounted.

Private Regulatory Failure
Private institutions acting in a regulatory capacity are no less prone to failure than are state actors. Arthur Andersen did not call attention to irregularities in the accounts of Enron. Ratings agencies were insufficiently attentive to the circumstances leading to the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008. When private actors are vigilant, they can be ignored. So it was that skepticism of Harry Markopolos regarding the practices of Bernard Madoff was widely disregarded. And private interests can be overzealous when acting in a regulatory capacity. Kuran and Sunstein (1999) observe that some campaigns mobilized by private institutions may actually produce outcomes that are inferior to the status quo ante.  
Accountability of Private Actors
With regulatory power so widely dispersed, accountability takes on even greater significance.  Most public officials are held to a set of standards. In the event that they fail to meet them, they are subject to sanctions. But most private actors have no legal mandate, and the relationships of various institutions may entail different accountability mechanisms (Black 2008). Private organic certification schemes themselves might be accredited by state, or inter-governmental authorities (Janssen and Hamm 2011).  Other private institutions may be held to account less formally, by the shrinking size of their membership or following, by their diminishing financial resource base, by their eroding reputation in the eyes of their peers and the public at large, and by the decreasing media attention accorded their words and deeds. 

The legitimacy of an institution or interest may depend on its credibility, which in turn depends on its veracity. Not all statements by private regulatory actors is free of hyperbole. The environmental group Greenpeace, for example, was criticized for significantly overstating the contents of the Brent Spar oil rig (Grant and Keohane 2005).  Outspoken critics of large corporations or industries have at times been known to play ‘fast and loose’ (Kuran and Sunstein 1999; Vidal 1997). Blatant misinformation, ethically questionable though it may be, can still serve a regulatory function. At least initially, it may call attention to a company or industry and its questionable practices. It may also serve to rally or mobilize supporters of a regulatory cause. The risk of eventual diminished legitimacy resulting from untruthfulness, however, remains very real.

One of the more vexing issues of accountability arises from the democratization of technology and the free exchange of ideas. And the sword of citizen participation is two-edged. One would not wish to see the advent of wiki witch hunts. One may recall the persistent allegations that the logo of Procter and Gamble was a satanic symbol.​[10]​ The dissemination of these allegations over a company’s voicemail system was an early example of digital commercial disparagement. More recently, one can see the vigilante-like mobilization of Chinese ‘netizens’ in furtherance of a boycott of Carrefour supermarkets in China during the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay. The protest was directed at perceived French support for Tibetan independence (Cheng 2009).

Powerful interests offended by the hyperbole of private regulators may take legal action in response (Kuran and Sunstein 1999).​[11]​  The extent to which this may have a chilling effect on legitimate expression is a matter of fundamental importance (Brenkert 2010). In any event, the market is an imperfect mechanism of accountability for regulators, as well as for regulated interests.

Theoretical implications
Developments in non-state regulatory activity since the publication of Responsive regulation invite theorizing on both normative and empirical dimensions. Basic work on the morphology of new regulatory institutions is called for, where the form and structure are more precisely delineated, and their relations with other institutions, state and private, are more clearly specified (Grabosky 1996). Vandenbergh’s (2007) more recent empirical studies on supply chain influences are exemplary. Work on the genesis of institutional forms would also be valuable. Bartley’s work on certification shows how the growing frustration with state inaction moved NGOs to establish certification schemes (albeit with the tacit encouragement and financial support of some governments). His detailed natural history of such hybrid institutions is a model for subsequent inquiry. Meidinger (2009) invites analytical attention to the properties of “polycentric authority structures” and to the evolutionary dynamics of “regulatory ecosystems,” including those in which governments compete with private regulators for authority (p242). The Ayres-Braithwaite pyramid may still be useful to represent regulatory response on the part of state institutions, but a heuristic embracing greater complexity is needed in order to model contemporary regulatory pluralism, whether choreographed or spontaneous. Alternative heuristics based on a three-dimensional pyramid, technically a tetrahedron, have been suggested to accommodate the multidimensional nature of pluralistic regulation (Grabosky 1997; Gunningham and Grabosky 1998).
 

Conclusion
To an extent much greater than envisaged by Ayres and Braithwaite two decades ago, a great deal of very potent regulatory activity is the work of institutions and actors independent of the state. Many of these non-state actors exercise control over regulated entities in a manner and to a degree that exceeds the willingness or the capacity of governments. The dramatic expansion of international trade has been accompanied by considerable cross-border commercial activity in which supply chain pressure on manufacturers situated on the other side of the planet has very real regulatory impact.  In addition, since the publication of Responsive Regulation, the growth and pervasiveness of digital technology have greatly facilitated the involvement of individual citizens in non-state regulatory activity. 

To the extent that there is a regulatory vacuum resulting from state inactivity, two fundamental questions might be addressed. The first concerns the capacity of independent private institutions to fill the gap. It is significant that the most vivid examples of private regulation may be seen in situations characterized by supply chain pressure, inspired by consumer preferences. When the commodity in question is something other than a consumer product, marketed by a retailer with reputational capital and a brand name to protect, the challenge of regulation becomes more difficult. Bartley (2007) suggests that the mining industry is relatively insulated from such private regulatory influences.

The second question surrounds the impact of private regulatory systems on state capacity. An optimistic view suggests that private regulatory activity might have a capacity-building effect, raising local awareness higher standards, and inspiring states to develop more rigorous regulatory institutions. At least, it might help states overcome inhibitions to greater regulation. A more pessimistic prediction would see the existence of private actors move the state to withdraw to the sidelines, and existing institutions to become atrophied. In the case of weak states, institutions may fail to develop in the first place. 

That various forms of private regulation have been shown to be effective does not necessarily mean that governments should abdicate their regulatory roles. Braithwaite’s later work, Regulatory Capitalism (2008) notes the increasing importance of both public and private regulation.  Vogel (2010) suggests that civil regulation is not a substitute for the exercise of state authority, and argues that it should be reinforced by and integrated with state regulatory systems (see also Buthe 2010). In any event, the regulatory space of the future is likely to be even more diverse and complex.
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